Abstract. Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs) are wireless networks that help improve driving efficiency and safety. VANETs provide a wide range of road services such as detecting traffic congestion, finding alternative routes, estimating time to destination, collision warning and many others. One of the biggest challenges in deploying VANETs is how to successfully address their security issues. These issues are mainly due to conflicting security requirements such as privacy and linkability. Exclusion-Based VANETs (EBV) was proposed as a generic framework to resolve some of VANETs' security issues. In this paper, we verify the feasibility and evaluate the performance of EBV through a set of simulation experiments. We measure time taken to deliver messages, packet loss, and average throughput. The results showed that EBV is competitive to other protocols in terms of efficiency and cost.
Introduction
Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs) are special version of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) used within vehicles as well as other facilities to improve traffic management. In VANETs, each vehicle is equipped with a wireless On-Board Unit (OBU) that allows the vehicle to communicate with other vehicles or with Road Side Units (RSUs) through short range wireless communication. VANETs communication may be classified as either vehicle to vehicle (V-V) or vehicle to infrastructure (V-I) communication. Several types of VANETs applications have been proposed in the literature. Examples of these applications are safety [1] , entertainment [2] , and information sharing applications [3] . A recent comprehensive survey on VANETs can be found in [10, 38, 41] . Securing VANETs implies different requirements including message integrity and authentication, vehicle privacy and confidentiality, non-repudiation, and short term linkability for investigation purposes. In addition, most applications, especially safety applications, require almost real-time message processing to satisfy application requirements. Providing security to VANETs applications is a very challenging task that has been widely explored in the last decade. The challenge lies in how to satisfy conflicting security requirements such as privacy on one side and linkability on the other side. Mobility with limited processing capabilities of installed hardware is another issue that needs to be addressed.
Key management is a main issue in securing VANETs. Despite the fact that Public key Infrastructure (PKI) is very successful in many applications, we believe that PKI alone might not be able to fulfill all the security requirements exist in VANETs under different conditions. Consider, for example, a transmission range of 150 m (i.e. 300 diameters) and heartbeat message frequency of 10Hz, as suggested in [4] . Under these conditions, number of messages, Certificate Revocation List (CRL) size, and the hardware limitations represent major obstacles that render developing a secure architecture for VANETs application a dilemma.
In our previous work [5] , we proposed Exclusion-Based VANETs (EBV), a generic framework for VANETs that uses a combination of PKI and symmetric key management to resolve some VANETs security issues. In this paper, we verify the feasibility of EBV and evaluate its performance through a set of simulation experiments. We've taken measure time to deliver messages, packet loss, and average throughput.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present some related work. In section 3, we review EBV structure and operations. In section 4, we evaluate EBV performance through a set of simulation experiments and report our results. Finally, in section 5, we give our conclusions and future work.
Related Work
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for signatures is used in the current IEEE 1609.2 standard for secure VANETs communications to verify messages [2] . Prior work has shown that the verification of single ECDSA signature requires 7ms of computation on proposed On Board Unit (OBU) hardware [8] . An efficient alternative to signatures is TESLA authentication technique [6] . In TESLA, symmetric cryptography with delayed key disclosure is used to provide the necessary asymmetry to prove that the sender was the source of the message. However, TESLA suffers from vulnerability to memorybased DoS attacks. A hybrid authentication mechanism was proposed in [7] which combines VANETs authentication using ECDSA signatures and TESLA++ (VAST) and provides the advantages of both of them.
Many solutions have been suggested to address the security issues in VANETs. The authors in [10] classified VANET security schemes into PKI-based schemes and non PKI-based schemes. They provided a comparison between the two different schemes in terms of efficiency, scalability, authenticity, integrity, short term linkability, privacy and nonrepudiation. In [9] the authors identified two categories of VANETs security solutions: PKI and the ID-Public Key Cryptosystem (ID-PKC). In PKI solutions, group signature is used as a cryptographic basis to achieve security requirements. For efficiency and scalability reasons, PKI based systems are combined with other cryptographic based systems, such as ID based cryptography. In the following two sub-sections, we review the previous work in the two categories and determine how each category meets the security requirements.
PKI proposals
There have been several proposals for achieving security requirements in VANETs based on PKI. There are early schemes [11] and [12] and more advanced schemes which may be classified as either with pseudonyms [13] [14] [15] [16] or group signature [9, [17] [18] [19] [20] . Pseudonyms have been used to protect the real identity of the vehicles. Using pseudonyms requires vehicles to store a large number of pseudonyms and certificates, where it is not convenient to implement a revocation scheme to revoke the malicious vehicle. Moreover, the pure pseudonym schemes do not support the secure functionality of authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation.
Traditional digital signature scheme, where a vehicle stores a very large number of public/private key pairs; has been proposed in [20] to address the privacy issue in VANETs. To achieve both message authentication and anonymity, the authors [20] proposed that each vehicle should be preloaded with a large number of anonymous public and private key pairs and the corresponding public key certificates. The authors in [21] introduced a group signature scheme to sign each message. In this scheme, each vehicle has its own private key and all group members share one public key. The work in [22] combines pseudonym schemes with group signature to avoid storing pseudonyms and certificates in vehicles.
Although the work described above provides strong security features such as authentication, non-repudiation, and confidentiality, they are not likely to be widely available because they require extra communication for the maintenance of public key certificates and for the management of CRLs. For these critical drawbacks, researchers investigated the use of other cryptographic schemes to be combined with PKI-based solutions.
ID-PKC proposals
ID-Public Key Cryptosystem (ID-PKC) [7] have been introduced in [9, [23] [24] [25] . In such cryptosystem, the user's information, such as phone number and e-mail address, can be used as a public key for verification and encryption. In other words, the ID-based cryptosystem simplifies the certificate management process. Kamat et al [23] proposed an ID-based security framework for VANETs. They use the ID-based signcryption scheme to provide authentication, confidentiality, message integrity, nonrepudiation and pseudonymity. In [26] the authors discussed approaches to prevent vehicles from fabricating their position information. Sun et al [25] presented a security framework that assures privacy using the preloading pseudonym and non-repudiation through an ID-based threshold signature scheme. Lin et al [9] proposed the RSUaided certificate revocation scheme. In [24] , the authors proposed SECSPP, a secure and efficient communication scheme based on non-interactive ID-based public-key cryptography, blind signature, and one-way hash chain.
Unfortunately, in all previous security frameworks, the private/public keys of VANET nodes are assigned by the Key Generation Center (KGC), which causes inherent weaknesses such as key escrow. The key escrow problem implies that: since the KGC issues their private keys using the master key, it may decrypt or sign any message [37] . This cannot guarantee strong non-repudiation and private communication because the KGC can sign and decrypt any message and abuse its accessibility. In [27] , Zhang, et al., proposed RAISE in which Vehicles generate a shared symmetric key with the RSU using a Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol. RSUs then become responsible for verifying the authenticity of the messages sent by vehicles. RAISE addressed the issue of VANETs scalability and communication overhead in case of large traffic intensity.
In [28] the authors proposed a security architecture to handle key escrow, in which a vehicle updates its private and public keys, and sends them to Road Traffic Utility (RTA) to be verified. The RTA generates the vehicle's new signature and sends it back. In [29] , the authors propose the use of certificate-based cryptography as a hybrid approach to combine the advantages of ID-based cryptography as well as the PKI approach. Several proposals were introduced on secure beaconing. In [30] , the authors proposed the usage of radar device attached to the front and the back of the vehicle in addition to a GPS receiver. In [10] , the authors studied existing security protocols, and they concluded that a main drawback is the lack of practical feasibility because of network overhead.
Recently, S. Junggab et al [39] introduced the first VANET cloud architecture. They also, identified the unique security issues and challenges when utilizing the cloud. A. Nikolaos et al [40] utilized tickets as cryptographic tokens to comply with vehicular communication standards yet preserve the privacy of the vehicle. D. Kevin et al [42] proposed the use of a tree like structure and called multi-level security architecture for VANETs. In this work when a node is attacked the parent node will deactivate the attacked node and redistribute the keys in that area.
EBV Structure and Operation
EBV [5] is a novel framework that utilizes Exclusion-Based System (EBS) [31] [32] [33] , Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and PKI to create a robust, efficient, and scalable security solution for VANETs. In our previous work EBV [5] , we utilized Exclusion Based System EBS , which was originally developed and tested for both security and efficiency in [31] . It was used further as a basis for several ad-hoc and sensor network key management in several papers, examples include [32, 33] .
Our proposed EBV consists of the following hierarchically organized entities (Fig. 1. ):
• Global VANET Authority (GVA): a trusted party that registers and manages CVAs, run by an international cooperation.
• Country VANET Authority (CVA): trusted country wide authority that registers all country's RVAs, run by national DMV.
• Regional VANET Authority (RVA): a trusted regional authority that manages an EBS system in a specific region (could be a city or a state), run by regional DMV.
• Road Side Unit (RSU): a node in VANETs that relays messages between vehicles and RVAs and vice versa.
• Vehicles: normal vehicles and special ones (e.g., Police and emergency vehicles). EBV framework resists several types of attacks including bogus information, unauthorized preemption, message replay and modification, impersonation, RSU relocation, movement tracking, impersonating an RSU, malicious vehicle, brute force, and illusion attacks [5] . The operation of EBV has three main phases which are described below.
Initialization and Registration Phase
When an RVA is deployed, it calculates a canonical matrix A[k+m, C(k+m,k)] with a large number of columns (i.e. larger than the number of vehicles expected in this region in the next 100 years). When choosing integers k and m an RVA preserves the following:
• The number of keys (i.e. k + m) is kept small. 58 (8 + 50) was used in the simulation generating a reasonable matrix of around 2 billion entries.
• m should be large enough (i.e. the number of vehicles an attacker needs 
….
to attack to reveal all keys of the group should be very large).
RVA initially loads every vehicle and RSU with the following items:
• 10-Digit vehicle identifier (VID, RSUID in case of RSU) allows for 10 billion different vehicles/RSUs.
• KGF a one-way trapdoor Key Generation Function. MD5 was used.
• 128bit session key S n , the current key in this area and its sequence number (SKSN 2Byte).
• A set of 8 administrative keys 128bit each generated by RVA. RVA maps every vehicle ID to a column in the matrix A, as well as, to the real identity of the vehicle.
• A bit string (BSV) of 58 bits that represents the column from matrix A assigned to this specific vehicle V, where a 1 means the vehicle has the key.
• RVA's Public key (RVA e ) and Product value N. (RSA 1024bit is used)
• Previous session key's sequence number.
• Previous key update message.
Normal Operation Phase
In EBV, the following events could occur in normal operation phase:
a) B msg Exchange
Every vehicle and RSU use the current session key (S n ) to securely communicate beacons. The proposed message format is shown in Fig. 2 . To provide a B msg with integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation, and linkability by RVA, a message (MSG) is attached to a signature-like string before sending it as follows: Get a 16B hash of MSG using MD5 function: Upon receiving a B msg , a vehicle checks TS, if within application's acceptable limits, it checks to see if SKSN is current. If correct, it uses its session key S n to decrypt the message.
PlainMsg = AES_DEC Sn (encMSG)
If the decrypted TS and SKSN match the plain ones, it means an owner of S n only could have generated the message. It then forwards the data to the installed application/s. The signature SIG will be ignored by receiving vehicles.
b) Updating session key
The session key, S n , is changed regularly to prevent statistical attacks. The new key S n+1 will be sent out through RSUs to all vehicles encrypted as follows:
Where RVA signature and certificate are standard RSA's. A receiving vehicle would use RVA's (e,N) to verify the attached signature. If valid, a vehicle would use AES_DEC sn to decrypt the new session key S n+1 and increment SKSN, otherwise it would ignore the message. If used, the message will be stored until the next update occurs.
c) Key request
If a vehicle V has been away from the network for long time, it might miss more than one key update message. It will realize this when receiving at least 10 B msg from different vehicles where: (10) V will stop sending B msg s to save bandwidth (BW). As soon as V receives a B msg from an RSU, it will send a Request for Key message (RK msg ). In a Diffie-Hellman like style, it creates an RSA public V e , private V d key pair, a product V n and a random request identifier RID (these are created offline to save time), then, it uses RVA's (e,N) to encrypt the message as follows:
SKSN of B msg <> (V's SKSN) && SKSN of B msg <> (V's SKSN +1) Mod 65535
Where VS n is the session key of V.
RK msg = R msg | R hash (13) The message is broadcasted and then forwarded by the RSU to the RVA. RVA uses its private key RVA d to verify the message as follows:
Based on VID and VS n , it gets the k keys of the vehicle that existed when Vs was in use from a key repository it has (remember that some of the k keys might have been modified when the vehicle was away). Then, it regenerates the signature R hash using the keys it retrieved from the matrix as follows: (17) Where S n and SKSN are the current session key and its sequence number, and (K 1 ' |….| K m ' ) are V's current admin keys. The originator RSU will broadcast RRK msg . If received by the requesting vehicle that checks RID to make sure this reply is intended to it, it then uses RVA's (e,N) to verify the attached signature and uses V d to decrypt the message plainMsg = RSA Vd (encRK msg ) (18) It then updates the keys where it has by replacing the old ones with the new ones.
d) Rekey process
RVA may decide that a certain vehicle needs to be evicted which based on a strong evidence where it has (getting the evidence is outside the scope of this paper). RVA starts a rekey process in the region, where all keys are known to the evicted vehicle X that will be modified by every other vehicle. Table1 shows a possible distribution of X's eight keys K e1 to K e8 and its bit-string BSX as stored in RVA to make things clearer.
The process starts by RVA issuing a new session key S n+1 and eight admin keys to replace the keys into vehicle X that knows. i.e. K e1 through K e8 . The other m = 50 keys, K 1 through K m Stay the same. 
RVA broadcasts the Rekey message, by broadcasting X's bit-string (BSX) in a message composed of the following m parts:
where 1<= i <=m=50, and K index is the absolute index of K i as shown in Table1. In this Part i we are sending the new session key S n+1 encrypted using one of the m keys (K i ) which vehicle X doesn't have. We are attaching the absolute index of the key K i to make it easier for receiving vehicles to know which key to use to decrypt this part. (21) Upon receiving the message, Each RSU broadcasts the message on behalf of the RVA.
After verifying a received message, a vehicle uses S n to decrypt the first level of encryption and extract BSX and m Parts: A vehicle checks BSX to see if it shares any keys with the evicted vehicle. If so, it continues to decrypt the jth Part with K j , any of its k keys:
Once it decrypts any of the m Parts, it updates its session key S n and uses it to replace all the keys it shares with vehicle X according BSX, by executing operations similar to (19) . Every vehicle should store the rekey message it receives until the next eviction or periodic change of S n occurs.
e) Forwarding key update message:
If a vehicle A that has a current session key S n is met with another vehicle B that uses the previous session key S n-1 , all A has to do is to replay the stored session key or Rekey message it stores. If the vehicle B possess S n-1 and is not revoked, it should be able to update its keys as described in updating a session key or in the rekey sections above.
Crossing Boarders Phase
When a vehicle from region R 1 approaches another region R 2 , it follows a procedure identical to that of a Key Request described above. The receiving RSU in R 2 relays the message to its RVA (i.e., RVA 2 ) that manages R2. RVA 2 sends the message to RVA 1 to make sure that the vehicle is not revoked and if so to get the message's plain text (only RVA 1 knows how to decrypt the message). Upon receiving the reply from RVA 1 , RVA 2 checks to see if this vehicle has a record in its matrix. If not, it registers the vehicle then it uses an identical technique to respond to the vehicle as described above. Otherwise, a reply message is directly constructed and sent. This phase was not simulated due to limitations in the software packages used and was left for future work.
Simulation Results
To our knowledge, EBV is the first utilization of EBS in VANETs, and hence, comparison with other models in many aspects was not an option. To verify EBV's feasibility, we decided to start by a simple simulation that uses one straight highway with one entrance and one exit. In our simulation we used NS3 in conjunction with VANET-Highway Package (VHP) [34] . VHP utilizes NS3 and provides traffic simulation capabilities; so that no external traffic traces are needed. In the following sub-sections, we explain the simulation parameters we used and report the simulation results.
Simulation Parameters
To carry out the simulation of EBV, we had to modify the following classes from the VHP: Controller, Highway, and Vehicle class.
These classes were modified to support EBV encryption and decryption. We also created the following new classes:
• AESEncryption: a class used to allow symmetric encryption/decryption.
• MDHashing: a class that implements MD5 hashing.
• RSAEncrDecr: a class used to allow RSA encryption/decryption.
• RoadSideUnit: a class that works as an RSU in an EBV system.
• RvaEbs: a class that works as an RVA in an EBV system.
All experiments were carried out on a Dell Latitude laptop with 2.53 GHz Core 2 Duo CPU and 4GB RAM. Simulation parameters were as follows:
• Highway: One-way, three lanes, 2.4 Km in length.
• RSUs: Three RSUs located at 400m, 1200m and 2000m. RSU 1 acts as an RVA to the system.
• Vehicles: 80% sedan, 20% truck, all equipped with wi-fi devices 250 -400 m range, speed up to 29m/s.
• Traffic flow and gap between vehicles : variable
• RVA: updates session key every 15s and randomly revokes a vehicle every 27s.
• B msg frequency: every 0.1 -0.3s random.
• Encryption/decryption: 128bit symmetric and 1024bit RSA.
• Simulation time: 300s
The simulation was repeated 300 times and an average of each measured value was considered.
Simulation Results
The results of our simulation were very promising. In our first experiment, we measured the time it takes a vehicle to do each of the following actions:
• Encrypt/decrypt a B msg .
• Create/verify a B msg signature.
• Create/extract Keyupdate message.
The results are shown in Table 2 below. It is very obvious that the time needed to do all operations in the OBU is quite small. In fact an OBU needs to receive from 740 vehicles sending 5 B msg /s to stay busy all the time. It was reported in [35] that signing/verification using 1024-RSA onboard requires 52/0.8ms, it is clear that our technique is well below in signing and slightly higher in verifying. On a similar hardware J. Hass [6] reported that signing/verification of ECDSA took around 1.5/1.8ms and for TESLA around 10µs to verify. Notice that the largest two measurements (3.18 and 8 ms) are done only by an RVA. We believe that OBU hardware should be at least equal to that we are using in these experiments.
To make sure that a key update message is distributed within a reasonable time, we performed our second experiment. We monitored all vehicles on the road after sending such message and recorded the average time it takes until all vehicles on the road are updated with new keys. We did this with different traffic intensities on the road and the results are shown in Fig. 3 . Fig. 3 shows that the maximum time to deliver keys to all vehicles on the road was around 0.25s, and the minimum was 0.1s. It is interesting to see that the time was higher at lower vehicle intensity. We believe that this was due to the forwarding mechanism we implemented. The higher the number of vehicles on the road gives more chance for this mechanism to be utilized. It was reported in [36] that the time required to distribute a CRL to 175 vehicles with best used technique was more than 25s. It is obvious that EBV revokes a vehicle in less than 0.5s. Also [6] reported that distributing a CRL to all vehicles in his simulation took well over 1000s with the best used technique. In the third experiment, we try to make sure that sending Bmsgs at such a high rate regardless of vehicle intensity does not consume too much bandwidth (BW). We measured the used BW for different vehicle intensities and the results are shown in Fig. 4 . The results were as expected and the BW used increased almost linearly as the number of vehicles increased. The BW maxed out at less than 3Mbps when the number of vehicles was a little more than 170. To check the effect of traffic intensity on loss ratio, we performed our fourth experiment. We measured the loss ratio at different traffic intensities. Fig. 5 shows that when the number of vehicles was 25 a loss ratio was around 4% and when the number of vehicles was 175, the loss was less than 6%. Although we don't have much in common with [25] , our traffic intensities are very close. A comparison between our results and a reconstructed curve from [25] shows that our system tends to have higher values for low intensities but for higher intensities our system gives better results.
Fig. 5. Packet loss ratio vs traffic intensity.
Time and space complexities are not discussed in this paper because it only deals with simulating EBV and the simulation results. The readers are advised to check the works at [5, [31] [32] [33] for algorithmic analysis.
5. Conclusions Key and CRL management in VANETs is a very difficult and time consuming task. While many proposed frameworks for VANETs achieve security, we believe they will not be adopted because of suffering any or a combination of: Certificate revocation list management, large computation time, large communication overhead, lack of scalability, or inability to defend some of the attacks.
In this paper, we tried to verify the feasibility of EBV (previously proposed by the authors) and study its efficiency through simulation using NS3. Our simulation experiments studied delivery time, throughput, and packet loss ratio under different numbers of vehicles and distances. Although a comparison to other protocols was very hard to do because of the different architecture and simulation tools and scenarios, our results shows competitiveness of EBV to other existing protocols considering both computation cost and efficiency.
We believe that our framework needs a full scale simulation, which considers real/artificial road maps with real/artificial traffic traces to be able to compare to other existing solutions. Another future work issue is to utilize DSRC instead of wi-fi as it has been set as a standard.
